We work in intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory IST (for a presentation, see [ 3 ] , where it is called ZF′I). Let us begin by fixing some notation. For each set A we write PA for the power set of A, and QX for the set of inhabited subsets of A, that is, of subsets X of A for which ∃x (x ∈ A). The set of functions from A to B is denoted by B A ; the class of functions with domain A is denoted by Fun(A). The empty set is denoted by 0, {0} by 1, and {0, 1} by 2.
We also formulate what we shall call the weak extensional selection principle, in which α(x) and β(x) are any formulas with at most the variable x free:
This principle asserts that, for any pair of instantiated properties of members of 2, instances may be assigned to the properties in a manner that depends just on their extensions. WESP is a straightforward consequence of ACQ 2 . For taking ϕ(u, y) to be y ∈ u in ACQ 2 yields the existence of a function f with domain Q2 such that fu ∈ u for every u ∈ Q2. Given formulas α(x), β(x), and assuming the antecedent of WESP, the sets U = {x∈2: α(x)} and V = {x∈2: β(x)} are members of Q2, so that a = fU ∈ U , and b = fV ∈ V, whence α(a) and β(b). Also, if ∀x∈2[α(x) ↔ β(x)], then U = V, whence a = b; it follows then that the consequent of WESP holds.
We are going to show that each of the logical principles tabulated above is equivalent (over IST) to a choice principle. Starting at the top of the list, we have first:
• WESP and SLEM are equivalent over IST.
Proof. Assume WESP. Let σ be any sentence and define 
Remark. The argument for WESP → SLEM is another "stripped down" version of Diaconescu's theorem that, in a topos, the axiom of choice implies the law of excluded middle. The result may be compared with that of [2] to the effect that the presence of extensional ε-terms renders intuitionistic logic classical.
Next, we observe that, while AC 1 is (trivially) provable in IST, by contrast Further, while DAC 1 is easily seen to be provable in IST, we have Proof. Given α, Define ϕ(x,y) ≡ α(y). Then, for f ∈ Fun(1), ∃x∈1ϕ(x,fx) ↔ α(f0) and ∃x∈1∀yϕ(x,y) ↔ ∀yα(y).
from which Un follows easily.
Conversely, given ϕ, define α(y) ≡ ϕ(0,y). Then from Un we infer that there exists b for which α(b) → ∀yα(y), i.e. ϕ(0,b) → ∀yϕ(0,y). Defining f ∈ Fun(1) by f = {〈0,b〉} then gives ϕ(0,f0) → ∃x∈1∀yϕ(x,y), whence ∃x∈1ϕ(x,fx) → ∃x∈1∀yϕ(x,y), and Un follows.
Next, while AC 2 is easily proved in IST, by contrast we have
• DAC 2 and Dis are equivalent over IST.
Proof. The antecedent of DAC 2 is equivalent to the assertion
which, in view of the natural correlation between members of Fun (2) and ordered pairs, is equivalent to the assertion
The consequent of DAC 2 is equivalent to the assertion
So DAC 2 itself is equivalent to
But this is obviously equivalent to the scheme
where y does not occur free in β, nor y′ in α. And this last is easily seen to be equivalent to Dis. This is in turn equivalent to the assertion, for any sentence α,
Now consider
Now (*) obviously entails Un. Conversely, given Un, there is b for which β(b) → ∀yβ(y).
Hence α ∨ β(b) → α ∨ ∀yβ(y), whence (*). So we have shown that
• Over IST, In order to provide choice schemes equivalent to Lin and Stone we introduce Therefore In conclusion, we show how certain of the principles we have introduced can be derived in the presence of term-forming operators.
The ε-and τ-operators are term-forming operators yielding, for formulas α(x), terms εxα and τxα in which the variable x is no longer free; they are introduced in conjunction with the axioms-the ε-and τ-schemes:
It is an easy matter to derive Un from the τ-scheme when τ is merely allowed to act on formulas with at most one free variable. When τ's action is extended to formulas with two free variables, the τ-scheme applied in IST yields the full dual axiom of choice ∀X * DAC X . For under these conditions we have, for any formula ϕ(x,y),
Let t ∈ Fun(X) be the map x τyϕ(x,y). Assuming that ∀f∈Y X ∃x∈Xϕ(x, fx), let a ∈ X satisfy ϕ(a,ta). We deduce from (*) that ∀y∈Yϕ(a,y), whence ∃x∈X∀y∈Yϕ(x, y). The dual axiom of choice follows.
In the case of the ε-operator, the number of free variables in the formulas on which the operator is allowed to act is an even more sensitive matter. If ε is allowed to act only on formulas with at most one free variable (so yielding only closed terms), the corresponding ε-scheme applied in IST is easily seen to yield both Ex and 1 * ac , and so also Lin. But it is (in essence) shown in [1] that, if only closed ε-terms are admitted, SLEM is not derivable, and so therefore neither is WESP. The situation changes dramatically when ε is permitted to operate on formulas with two free variables. For then from the corresponding ε-scheme it is easy to derive ACX for all sets X, and in particular ACQ 2 , and hence also SLEM.
I have found three ways of strengthening, or modifying, the single-variable ε-scheme so as to enable it to yield SLEM. The first, presented originally in [2] , is to add to the ε-scheme Ackermann's Extensionality Principle, viz.
From these WESP is easily derived, and so, a fortiori, SLEM.
The second approach is to take the ε-axiom in the (classically equivalent) form
From this we can intuitionistically derive SLEM as follows:
Given a sentence β, define α(x) to be the formula
Then from (*) we get
winding up with
The third method is to allow ε to act on pairs of formulas, each with a single free variable. Here, for each pair of formulas α(x), β(x) we introduce the "relativized" ε-term εxα/β and the "relativized" ε-axioms Βut the relativized ε-scheme is not derivable in the intuitionistic ε-calculus since it can be shown to imply SLEM. To see this, given a formula γ define α(x) ≡ x = 1 β(x) ≡ x = 0 ∨ γ.
Write a for εxα/β. Τhen we certainly have ∃xβ(x), so (1) gives β(a), i.e. And the conjunction of this with (3) gives γ ∨ ¬γ, as claimed.
